

LAST

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
APO US Forces 96222

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MACJ261

29 December, 1967

SUBJECT: TRANSLATION REPORT

LOG No. 12-1739-67

## OSD, ARMY Declassification/Release Instructions on File

1. Attached is a full English translation of a captured enemy document.

## 2. Capture Data:

- a. Title: 1967-68 Winter-Spring Campaign Objective, MR 2.
- b. Date: 5 December 1967
- c. Location: XS596613
- d. Unit: B/5/60 Inf (M), 3/9th US Inf Div.

e. Synopsis: Directive states that the VC/NVA must swing the balance of power to their side. To do this, they must annihilate a major part of the "enemy" troop strength. Therefore, in MR2, special efforts will be made to conduct concentrated attacks with an even higher tempo and on an ever-larger scale to destroy large enemy units and put them on the defensive strategically, as well as tactically.

3. Date document received at Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC): 8 December 1967. This document was summarized in Bulletin # 8416, dated 12 December 1967.

4. In the event the attached translation report is declassified, the "CONFIDENTIAL" marking and this cover letter will be removed.

*J. V. Gally*  
A.L. GALLI  
LTC, USA  
Dir, US Elm, CDEC

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-----FULL TRANSLATION-----

[HAT]/VC CLASSIFICATION/

[Page 1 of original text]

MILITARY REGION 2  
MILITARY AFFAIRS PARTY COMMITTEE  
AND HEADQUARTERS.

DIRECTIVE

POLITICAL TASK FOR THE 1967-1968  
WINTER AND SPRING CAMPAIGN.

PART 1

PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 1967-  
68 WINTER AND SPRING CAMPAIGN

1. The US aggressors have incurred defeats in all battlefields. Our army and people in both North and South Vietnam have gained great victories in the military and political fields. The situation has turned in our favor and incurs disadvantages for the enemy. The need of profiting from our successes to defeat the enemy while he is deadlocked, strategically confused, plagued with difficulties and politically isolated, has become pressing for our army and people.

The present situation is very favorable for our army and people to dash forward to annihilate, wear down, and disintegrate the enemy, step up the three offensive movements [Sic], and carry out the [general] offensive and [general] uprising designed to liberate the rural and urban areas and South Vietnam.

The enemy pacification effort in the Mekong river valley within our Military Region 2 has caused additional difficulties for us. But, the enemy pacification plan has basically failed. The enemy is being confused in the three areas [mountain, city and low land].

The enemy in areas under continuous attack by us often demonstrates many weak points and negligence. He copes with us in a confused and passive manner.

2. With such a favorable revolutionary situation and in execution of the mission and strategic plan laid down by TW and TWC [respectively Central Executive Committee of the Lao Dong Party in NVN, and the Central Office of South Vietnam], the Military Affairs Party Committee, and the South Vietnam Liberation Army Headquarters, and the Military Region [2] Party Committee and Headquarters have decided to concentrate their efforts in guiding and stepping up the general attack during the 1967-68 Winter and Spring Campaign.

The success of the Winter and Spring Campaign of this year will have important strategic significance. Our army and people in Military Region 2 will engage in a major effort to defeat the US imperialists in the third phase of their limited war.

Our army and people will strongly attack the enemy along three fronts: political, military and troop proselyting. While the enemy is off guard and confused, our people and army will continuously rise up in order to gain outstanding victories during the coming Winter and Spring Campaign.

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These victories will tip the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy in the entire military region, contribute greatly to the frustration of the U.S. imperialists' limited war, and the achievement of decisive victory in the shortest possible time.

(There has been a Resolution of the Military Region Party Committee concerning the objective of the 1967-1968 Winter and Spring Campaign).

PART II

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MISSION AND NATURE OF THE  
POLITICAL TASK

I. INDOCTRINATE THE CADRE AND SOLDIERS WITH THE PURPOSE AND REQUIREMENTS OF THE WINTER-SPRING PHASE, AND THE PARTY'S DETERMINATION AND STRATEGY IN THIS PHASE. THIS IS THE KEY FACTOR IN MAINTAINING OUR DETERMINATION TO FIGHT AND WIN.

1. We have gained an advantage for this year: The party, the troops and the people thoroughly assimilated their mission and understood the situation (the 3 forces were improved and replenished) before we started the new phase. We should, therefore, continue to provide effective leadership and training.

All activities should be performed in line with the determination and strategy of GOSVN, during the Winter-Spring phase and also after this phase ended.

We should accomplish the 3 missions, meet the 5 requirements, and adopt the 6 combat tactics as specified by the Region Party Committee and MR Party Committee. We should realize the strategic importance of success in the Winter-Spring phase and the necessity of insuring it. (During studies, all of these features should be carefully examined together with this document). While studying, we should do whatever is possible to strengthen the determination of our cadre and soldiers so that they will rush forward to score heroic feats. We should demonstrate to them the specific tasks they will accomplish in the Winter-Spring phase, and also the plan they will follow. For instance, combat activities should be accompanied with explanations such as: where to fight the enemy, when to fight him, which enemy to fight, what purpose to attain. Criticism and recapitulation of results should go along with making decisions and launching attacks.

In the local areas, the units should be thoroughly indoctrinated with the Winter-Spring strategy of the Region Party Committee, MR Party Committee, and the MR Headquarters. Each cadre and soldier should achieve great improvement in ideology and have firm determination to heighten their revolutionary spirit. They must overcome all difficulties, endure hardships and make sacrifices. Together with the people, they will do their best to accomplish the tasks imposed on their units and local areas by the higher levels.

Even after the Winter-Spring phase has ended, they will continue to score other successes. They will preserve their enthusiasm, consolidate their ideology and keep up their determination.

2. Propaganda and motivation:

Propaganda and motivation should be given particular notice. There should be intensive propaganda and motivation among the cadre, the soldiers and the people. The cadre and soldiers should be made to understand

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that they are revolutionary fighters. In addition to killing the enemy, they also have the mission of propagandizing and educating the people. The role of the people in an uprising should be heightened. They should not rely too heavily upon the troops and neglect their own task, which consists of participating in political struggle and guerrilla warfare.

Information concerning success and victories in North and South Vietnam, in the Military Region and in the local area and unit should be widely disseminated to motivate the people into an emulation and set examples for future actions.

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The armed force should act as the main propaganda force when it operates or bivouacs in an area.

The Party chapter should train all cadre and soldiers on the performance of the 5 step revolutionary task. The revolutionary task is to conduct propaganda in the Winter-Spring Campaign and coordinate with the people in launching political and troop proselyting attacks against the enemy.

## II. REALIZATION OF THE WILL TO ATTACK THE ENEMY:

1. First of all, we should properly assess the enemy as well as the friendly situation from the viewpoint of the working class.

After two reorientation training courses, we all knew the weak and the strong points of the enemy as well as those of the friendly forces. This made us realize that our armed force and people would gain the final victory.

In the recent execution of the Winter-Spring phase, committee echelon and cadre of the Party Chapter paid more attention to the performance of the ideological task and at the same time constantly heightened the determination to attack the enemy.

During a series of meetings, Party Committee echelon, Party Chapter and cadre made an analysis of the enemy as well as the friendly situation in the local area in reference to strength.

The analysis of the enemy situation was made in order to easily obtain victory but not to frustrate our fighting determination.

With revolutionary pride, we took the viewpoint of the working class as a basis for our successive attacks against the enemy.

The assessment of the enemy situation was usually introduced to all units so that the latter strengthened and heightened their determination to fight the enemy.

Good examples were used as a basis for teaching revolutionary determination to fight. (For instance, the determination of the people of Long An, D Girong and D267 [269th Bn] to fight the enemy during the 1966-67 Winter Spring Campaign was used in training.

Recently, D514 [514th Bn] destroyed 1 US C [Company] during a counter operation attack.

D 263 [263th Bn] and D267 [267th Bn] destroyed an enemy pacification team and a Biet Kich [GVN special forces] force during an engagement.

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into Cao Lanh City in order to attack the enemy.

In different villages and hamlets, all units should study good examples.

In addition to the implementation of the ideological task, all effective measures were taken to help all units successfully accomplish their combat task during the Winter-Spring Campaign.

2/ Implement and heighten the determination to fight while Helping Committee echelon and cadre understand the combat plan.

Train cadre on the 6 fighting methods to meet the requirements of the region Party Committee, the military region Party Committee, the military region Party Committee and the political struggle.

Make a plan of successive attacks suitable for the role of the armed forces. At the same time, build fighting methods suitable to every type of strategic area.

Kill, weaken, or disorganize the enemy force.

Place the enemy in the defensive position and at the same time, create favourable conditions for the people to rise up against the enemy.

Step up guerrilla activities. Coordinate 3 pronged attacks and the 3 types of the troops. Try to cause greater casualties to the enemy.

[Page 4 of original text]

The very important link for this Winter and Spring campaign concerns the political task. We must thoroughly understand leadership and be able to adapt intelligently the 6 recapitulated methods of attack. We must pay particular attention to the following new points:

a/ Our immediate objective consists of assuring a decisive victory. Our motto for motivating the people will be "make all out efforts to restore political control".

We should try to implement the above objective during this Winter and Spring campaign. Consequently, our activities should be encouraging to the people's insurrection. We must do our best to conduct strategic attacks, gain military superiority within a specific field (emphasis placed on a strategic point). We should plan for the concentration of troops and should stay close to the enemy and disintegrate his units, including minor units (Instruct Province headquarters to carry out the resolution of N2). We should try to paralyze or disintegrate enemy units. Example: when destroying 2 or 3 d's [battalions], we should also destroy their headquarters and the enemy Regiment's headquarters. By so doing, our strategic concept of operation will be implemented. This will help us gain military superiority over a specific field (emphasis placed on a strategic point) and paralyze and disintegrate our targets (enemy units). This will certainly help the people of local areas revolt.

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To be able to defeat the Americans, it is also necessary to both paralyze and disintegrate the puppet forces, separate them from the US forces, and provide conditions to instigate an anti-war movement among the US troops.

We must deal the enemy telling blows, but at the same time we should work out a plan to provide a means of escape for the puppet forces, to cause them to "dissolve" by big portions. With our victories steadily increasing, Party-Committee cadre and unit commanders must attach a greater importance to troop proselyting work. A good military leader must be at the same time a good troop proselyting cadre. He must know how to cooperate with local authorities to work out a plan to motivate the local people to stage political struggles at an even higher rate.

In combat, he must know how to quickly terminate the engagement accounting for many enemy casualties and POW's while suffering as few losses as possible. Consequently, we must be determined to inflict a great number of combat casualties on the enemy, block his escape and reinforcement routes, kill his military leaders, and chief radio switchboard operators; destroy his artillery and armor positions, etc... / sic / . This would mean that we know how to create opportunities to politically attack the enemy, and to cause him to disintegrate as a whole.

In preparation for this year's Winter-Spring campaign, leaders of various levels must indoctrinate cadre and soldiers so that they may have a full understanding of the significance and importance of the troop proselyting mission and the POW policy. Cadre and soldiers must be made to clearly realize the necessity of this task and they need to look to the people for assistance and cooperation in troop proselyting work. (The PRC / possibly Political Affairs Office / has a plan to provide guidelines for the troop proselyting task, to be carried out during the Winter-Spring campaign.) On their part, units must make concrete and realistic troop proselyting plans for use in every attack so that we may apply the tactics of both strongly attacking and destroying the enemy and causing him to simultaneously disintegrate and become seriously paralyzed.

3. To insure that our attacks are steady and fierce, we must take positive steps to build up our military forces. (Concerning the activation of armed forces of various types, it is mandatory that NO/N2 / Decision N2 / be correctly and promptly executed.)

Regarding the political task, each unit, each Party Chapter, each cadre, and each Party member must be made to realize his responsibility in the mission of acquiring additional men to join the guerrilla forces and youths to enroll in the military ranks to provide replacements for his own unit. Each comrade must be made to realize that his unit is not only an outstanding one which fights competently, but is also one that knows how to maintain its strength and vigor through its own means, knows how to obtain its own replacements, and knows how to convince youths to join the army to destroy the enemy.

Province and district level Party Committee cadre must take the greatest care to increase the strength of civilian fighters and guerrilla forces, particularly district local forces, sapper forces, and village and hamlet guerrilla forces.

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For the time being, our military forces are under strength but there is still a requirement for conducting strong attacks against enemy deep areas, towns, cities, and rear bases. In view of this requirement, and to achieve significant results, the best force to be committed is the sapper force. We must underscore the technical capability and tactical impact of the attacks of sapper units. The whole of MR II must double efforts to implement the plan of building up the sapper force, to "sapperize" infantry units [transform them into sapper/infantry units]. We have positioned our sapper elements in all strategic points, towns, cities, rear installations and depots of the enemy to take charge of them. Attention must be paid to the use of sapper elements in all attacks on towns, rear bases, and lines of communication, and also in our counter-sweep operations. Only with sapper elements can we conduct surprise raids against enemy fortified positions, hideouts, and against their strongest areas such as airfields, towns, cities, key installations and depots, artillery positions, armor positions, and harbors.

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As for the political mission in this Winter-Spring campaign, we should make all cadre and soldiers fully aware of sapper tactics. Based on this, Party Committee echelons and commanders must effectively lead tasks of ideological indoctrination.

As for the development of our armed forces, we must attach importance to quality and quantity and, at the same time, fully comprehend the following subjects:

- Political indoctrination and ideological leadership.
- Training of "three good" key cadre, establishment of the working procedures for the members of the Party Committee, the province coordination and operations committees, and district unit.
- Concurrent training tasks.
- Improvement of the degree of organization and leadership of cadre.

#### 4. Initiation of the concepts of resentment and revenge; indoctrination of the concept of the (working) class:

After the advanced reorientation phase, we should continuously pay attention to the development of successful reorientation results, focus our efforts on the problem of constantly building up our patriotism, and sharpen our concept of resentment towards the US aggressors and their henchmen. Moreover, the concept of revenge must be heightened and represented by actions against the enemy in order to avenge our compatriots and comrades. Publicizing crimes of the enemy is an effective measure to motivate the people's ideology. Crimes of the US and its lackeys are innumerable; they have incessantly caused our people many calamities, both in the North and in the South; they have become more cruel after every defeat. Publicizing hardships and crimes caused by the enemy must be included in the activities of every unit. In particular we should indoctrinate every unit to love the North and socialism, our Fatherland and beloved capital Hanoi, and our compatriots throughout the country (with the combination of culture and history of Vietnam).

#### 5. Strengthen view points and improve attitudes to be quick and lively and ensure unity in completing tasks or combat missions:

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We should use the "offensive concept", which has been considered the "military attempt" of the Party, as an ideological guideline for all activities. We should have high determination in attacking the enemy continuously to develop our forces and seize the initiative on the battlefield. If we have thorough understanding of such problems, we will defeat any kind of enemy, anywhere under any circumstances. If we have high determination in attacking the enemy, we will certainly overcome any difficulties and obtain great victories.

-In accordance with the combat experiences learned during the last "Đông Xuân" [Winter-Spring] Campaign and the Operational Phase in the Summer, we have noted that the enemy was very crafty. If he detected our combat tactics and our attempts in fighting him in large scale battles, he would change his operating procedures.

Therefore, in order to attack the enemy continuously and to kill a significant number of enemy troops, we should always study to understand the counter-measure he will take to deal with our attempts. Thus we will fight and defeat the enemy. We should train our men to have quick and smooth manners during combat, appropriate to the aims of destroying the enemy on the battlefield.

Battlefield preparation cadre must work with urgency, rapidity accuracy and in line with political responsibilities. They must stay close to their targets and ensure speed in the preparations by all organizations for combat. Furthermore, they must maintain security for surprise attacks. Troops must be highly mobile.

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As a result, political activities should be conducted on a permanent basis and troops must always be in a state of combat readiness. Provide basic training for the soldier frequently. In so doing, we will be able to successfully accomplish our immediate tasks upon receipt of our combat orders. Ensure success in our political activities. Train soldiers so that they can fight the enemy effectively. The number of recruits must always be sufficient to meet our combat requirements.

In recent counter attacks and raids, namely the attack on US Forces conducted by the Mỹ Tho, Battalion on the night of 30 July, the soldiers displayed high determination in fighting the enemy. The 263d Battalion gained the initiative in countering the enemy's operations and in destroying them. The soldiers and people in Mỹ Tho were determined to stay close to Highway #4 to destroy it. In Kiến Phong, our units resolutely executed deep thrusts into the enemy's rear base. At Vang Quới and Phú An Hòa in Bến Tre, we gained success in encircling the enemy's forces and in encroaching upon their land.

Through the above examples, we see that whatever the season (monsoon or dry), troops (US or puppet) or combat targets (lines of communication, rear bases or weak areas), we gain victories when we are highly determined to attack the enemy. No matter how large or small our strength may be, we should bravely attack the enemy to the last man.

In addition to the strong points in combat determination, we automatically co-ordinated activities with friendly units, in a positive manner, throughout the Region. It is necessary that we recapitulate and study the above achievements for later operations.

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Place special emphasis on the political responsibilities of the rear service branch. Cadre and soldiers of this branch should base their critique of political responsibilities on the criteria laid down for combat activities, victories and health. This is the revolutionary ideology of the branch. Every echelon should intensively inspect the rear service activities of its unit.

### III. PLACE EMPHASIS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF "THREE GOOD" PARTY CHAPTERS DURING THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN :

Develop three-good party chapters and turn them into strong armed forces for the Party, being able to lead youth in combat missions in the Winter-Spring Campaign. Attention is invited to the following points:

a. In this campaign, it is necessary to attach importance to the ideological leadership of cadre, party members and soldiers. Train party members and improve secretaries of party chapters and chapter party committees in 3 aspects.

1. Activate forward party chapters, group chapters and outstanding units. Party chapters should be considered the most important.

2. Every year, the Winter-Spring Campaign is an opportunity for us to develop our party chapters. The development of party chapters and accomplishment of immediate tasks should be carried out at the same time. This year, special emphasis should be placed on civilian, enemy and puppet proselyting in order to attack and smash enemy forces.

3. During the meetings before and after combat, it is necessary that we pay attention to the "three good" criteria laid down for combat activities. In so doing, we will be able to improve the combat leadership of party chapters and party members.

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Improve the methods and the contents of the Party Chapter's activities according to the following manners: concentrate on the "three goods" main point; display the internal democracy; and encourage Party members to actively contribute their initiative to leadership. Through combat and working trials, actively develop the Party and the Group in order to secure the leadership, development and combat requirements.

b. The Party Committee echelon and the Party Civil Affairs Committee's duties:

To ensure the proper activities of the Party Committee echelon sequence in this present specific situation, the requirement should be the successful implementation of the collective command and individual accountability principle. Ensure regular meetings for the Party Committee echelon and the Party Civil Affairs Committee in order to provide timely resolutions concerning leadership and guidance for the activities of various armed forces. (Normal and special meetings, consultative meetings and reports).

Render assistance to various Party Chapters of District Local Forces, their subordinates which are on TDY for special missions, Party Chapters of Sapper Units, Special Action Units, Rear Services and other branches.

Our main effort should be directed toward the improvement of cadres' ability. In various villages, attend to the leadership and indoctrination of hamlet and village guerrillas.

IV. THE SECURITY DUTY:

Following are the main requirements of the security duty:

Ensure absolute maintenance of security concerning all combat lines and plans in this period. Provide education and administration in order to ensure the safety of the unit. Critical situations should never occur and alter the development and combat ability of one's unit.

To ensure the above requirements, various Party Committee echelons and responsible cadres must pay attention to the following duties: Provide close leadership in order to carry out well the 2d step of the campaign concerning "heightening one's vigilance and maintaining security." Increase regular indoctrination concerning the internal awareness in order to keep up a good execution of the promulgated security regulations.

- Provide proper preservation of documents and execute well the regulations concerning the distribution of documents. In combat, provide a plan for enemy deception in order to keep him from us.

- Increase the administration of the internal political situation in order to prevent undesired events in one's unit.

- Closely coordinate with the security agency to know the enemy's tactics and plots concerning intelligence and "Chiêu Hồi" / open arms /. This will provide adequate measures to face them. Coordinate with the local officials in order to administer and control the politically suspected elements and to repress the security agents and informants who have been planted in various centers of activity concerning the troops' operation and combat.

- Carry out the following tasks well: March, bivouac, estimation of ammunition, locations of various medical stations and inspection of the civilian laborers who serve the troops in the battlefields.

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V. CARRY OUT WELL THE FOUR MAIN POLICIES:

Strictly execute various main policies, especially the civilian proselyting policy and the policy concerning the treatment of disabled veterans and war dead, which represent the nature of our army. At present, in our area 2, the three forces poorly execute these policies.

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a. Committee echelons and the command committee must review recent execution of the policy for shortcomings, so that the Winter-Spring Campaign may be successfully conducted.

b. Civilian Proselyting:

It is requested that the review of the civilian proselyting policy and the execution of the directives of higher echelons be carried out to the letter (as D261 [261st Bn] did).

Cadre and soldiers must be trained in the 5 steps of the masses' activities.

Provide aid and protection for the people and conduct propaganda activities to motivate them to rise up and fight the enemy during the Winter-Spring Campaign.

c. The evacuation of dead and wounded soldiers must be faithfully carried out by committee echelons, Party Chapters and cadre-in-charge. Burials should be carefully made (with coffins, clothing and tomb numbers). Devote special attention to wounded and dead soldiers. The recommendation of outstanding units and individuals, especially of dead and wounded soldiers for awards must also be taken into account. Those who are responsible for the successful implementation of the civilian proselyting mission and the "four policies" must be recommended for awards.

Adhere strictly to the disciplinary actions imposed on units or individuals who, through a lack of proper responsibility and working spirit, fail to follow the policies for civilian proselyting and for dead and wounded soldiers.

In addition, the prisoner of war, surrenderers, and war booty policies must receive faithful compliance from everyone.

-Most important in a battle, pay attention first to dead and wounded soldiers, second to the recovery of our weapons, (to maintain our superiority in modern weaponry), third to the prisoner-of-war policy and fourth to the seizure of enemy weapons. (Weapons and ammunition are necessary for us, so we must seize as much as possible.)

PART III

Some problems concerning the political and Party missions that must be thoroughly understood.

The political missions during this phase of activity have revealed many problems concerning our leadership. These problems must be clearly understood.

1. Thoroughly understand the purpose, meanings and missions of the 1967-68 Winter-Spring Campaign. At the same time, clearly understand our Party's strategic intentions. To strongly motivate our determination to continuously attack the enemy, we must heighten our sense of political responsibility, place particular emphasis on the most important missions, and on our own behavior.

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We must also have direct, resourceful leadership and guidance.

2. Indoctrinate our personnel on politics and guide their ideological thinking in order to enable them to thoroughly understand the requirements, the offensive plan and the intention of the Region. They must also understand the political mission in local areas.

3. Combat leadership should be emphasized, concerning the following points:

- Launch annihilating and continuous attacks on the enemy.
- Improve our guerrilla warfare in accordance with the concentration of forces in order to destroy the enemy units.
- Carry out the six combat tactics. Launch attacks on enemy rear areas, cities and communication axes.

Coordinate our three fronts, three areas and three types of forces, so that each may fiercely attack the enemy.

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- In order to ensure success in our attacks, we must try to build up our forces both in quality and quantity.

- Reviews, recapitulations of activities and experiences and critiques and self-critiques must be made regularly in order to ensure progress in our leadership and guidance missions.

4. In organization, we must impose the leadership of the Party Chapter and various agencies, and initiate a movement for the establishment of the "3 good" Party Chapter.

The capabilities and working style of D [Battalion] Party Committee, Province and District cadre must also be improved.

5. Cadre's activities: Before this phase of activities begins we must reorganize, improve and replace cadre in order to increase the capabilities and quality of the unit. We must strengthen cadre and should not hesitate to recommend for promotion those cadre who are proficient and mature in combat and in their missions.

The Political Staff of the Military Region has prepared operations plans for the emulation, propaganda and enemy proselyting activities.

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In the recent Winter-Spring Campaign, due to the supplementary reorientation, and study of the letters from the Region [Party] Committee and Military Region [Party] Committee as well as the timely and successful preparations for political and Party activities, our armed forces displayed a strong determination to fight and to win. They subsequently recorded striking victories.

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In the coming Winter-Spring Campaign in answer to the appeal of Uncle Ho, in compliance with the Resolution of the Party, and on the road to final victory, our army and people will move ahead and conduct strong and continuous attacks on the enemy. We will thus pave the way for the general attack and general uprising, to gain a historically significant and unique victory over the enemy and to crush the Americans' attempt to invade our country.

Because the coming combat missions of the armed forces in Region 2 are very difficult and urgent, the victory they are going to gain can only be a very brilliant one.

Concerned Party Committees at various levels, Party Chapters and cadre must ensure satisfactory implementation of political activities among the armed forces. In so doing, they will strengthen the leadership role of the Party, heighten the revolutionary spirit and creative thinking of our cadre, soldiers and the masses. This will encourage them to fulfill their combat missions and the glorious tasks with which the Party and the people have entrusted them, in the next Winter-Spring Campaign.

Date: 2 September 1967

For The Military Region [Party] Committee  
and the Military Region 2 Command  
Secretary and acting Political Officer  
Le Hong Thang.

Remarks: The original text of this directive on the Winter-Spring Campaign's political mission should be disseminated to C [Company] and District Unit cadre only.

The following points should not be disseminated to b [Platoon] cadre and lower.

- Significance of the 6 combat methods.
- The targets and objects to be destroyed in the general attack and general uprising.
- The plan for the activation of the Sapper units and their strategic role (Part 2, Section 2, point 2).

----- END OF TRANSLATION -----

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